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Abstract
This paper explores the financialization of pensions in four 
European welfare states: the United Kingdom, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. In these welfare states, finan-
cial markets and financial actors have become increasingly 
important for pension provisions. Pension financialization 
is a variegated phenomenon, involving changes in funding 
mechanism, plan design, financial management and the 
centrality of funded pension schemes in the political econ-
omy. Nationally-specific configurations of these dimensions 
have created distinct patterns of pension financialization in 
the four cases. I argue that each pattern is the outcome of 
specific sticking points for policy reform that have emerged 
out of the institutional context of the national pension sys-
tem. Locating these institutional sticking points helps iden-
tify common mechanisms of pension financialization across 
cases that are characterized by empirical variegation.
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Resumen
Este artículo analiza la financiarización de las pensiones 
en cuatro estados de bienestar europeos: el Reino Unido, 
Alemania, los Países Bajos y Suecia. En estos estados de 
bienestar, los mercados y actores financieros se han vuelto 
cada vez más importantes en la provisión de las 
pensiones. La financiarización de las pensiones es un 
fenómeno varia-do, que implica cambios en el mecanismo 
de financiación, el diseño del plan, la gestión financiera y la 
centralidad de las pensiones de capitalización en la 
economía política. Las configuraciones nacionales 
específicas de estas dimensio-nes han creado patrones 
distintos de financiarización en los cuatro casos. Sostengo 
que cada patrón es el resultado de puntos de conflicto 
específicos para la reforma de dichas políticas, que han 
surgido del contexto institucional del sis-tema nacional de 
pensiones. La localización de estos ele-mentos de 
referencia institucionales ayuda a identificar me-canismos 
comunes de financiarización en todos los casos, que se 
caracterizan por una variedad empírica.
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Introduction
Research on financialization has grown exponen-
tially since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. The 
initial focus of the financialization scholarship on the 
non-financial corporation emerged out of the specific 
context of the United States with its highly developed 
financial markets (Krippner 2005). Since then, schol-
ars of financialization have identified many other ar-
eas where the growing role of financial markets and 
actors has manifested itself in contemporary societ-
ies, including the household, the state and the natu-
ral world (see Mader et al. 2020 and other articles 
in this special issue). The growth of financialization 
studies has also been met with a widening geograph-
ical scope of the literature with a growing number of 
studies on financialization in traditionally bank-based 
economies (Hardie and Howarth 2009), state capital-
ist economies (Wang 2020) and emerging markets 
(Bonizzi et al. 2020). Scholars’ forays into additional 
sites and locations of financialization have resulted 
in new understandings of the distinctive and often 
uneven manifestations of financialization across dif-
ferent types of capitalist economies (Karwoski and 
Stockhammer 2017). 
Yet, the contemporary focus on variegation also 
complicates scholarly understandings of financial-
ization. Financialization remains an elusive term, as 
scholars employ a host of definitions and conceptual-
izations to describe related, but not identical phenom-
ena. Among the most well-known of these is Gerald 
Epstein’s definition of financialization as “the increas-
ing role of financial motives, financial markets, finan-
cial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies” (2005:3). 
However, as has already been noted by several 
contributors to this debate (Engelen 2008, Christo-
phers 2015), such fairly broad understandings of fi-
nancialization run the risk of conceptual stretching. 
When conceptualizations of financialization become 
so broad that they encompass almost ‘everything fi-
nance’, the concept may lose its analytical prowess 
(Van der Zwan 2014: 101). For this reason, Mader 
et al. (2020:8) have proposed that scholars develop 
conceptualizations of financialization that are 1) limit-
ing, 2) mechanism-oriented, and 3) contextual. 
Studies of pension financialization in Europe have 
largely mirrored the developments in the broader 
field of scholarship. Pension financialization refers 
to the growing role of financial markets and financial 
actors in the provision of old-age pensions. Starting 
with an initial focus on the United Kingdom (Waine 
2001; Langley 2004), research on pension finan-
cialization now includes case studies of the Nordic 
countries (Anderson 2019; Belfrage 2008), continen-
tal Europe (Bonizzi and Churchill 2017; Natali 2018), 
Iceland (Macheda 2012), Portugal (Rodrigues et al. 
2018) and Turkey (Saritas 2020). These studies have 
identified changes to existing pension systems along 
several dimensions (i.e. Wiss 2019), four of which 
I will consider here. The first is capital-funding as a 
method of financing, which involves the investment of 
pension savings in financial markets with the goal of 
generating returns to cover future liabilities. A second 
dimension of pension financialization relates to the 
introduction of pension contracts that make benefit 
levels conditional upon financial market performance, 
as is the case with Defined Contribution contracts. 
Third, pension financialization involves particular 
changes to financial management, specifically the 
growing exposure to investment risk as a result of 
changing asset allocations. Lastly, pension financial-
ization may refer to the centrality of funded pension 
schemes in the (global) political economy. 
The goal of this paper is to provide an interpre-
tive lens through which to analyse empirically distinct 
ma nifestations of pension financialization. To this 
end, I will identify patterns of pension financialization 
in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden. The cases represent different welfare 
state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990): a liberal 
welfare state (United Kingdom), a social-democratic 
welfare state (Sweden) and two conservative welfare 
states (Germany and the Netherlands). The two con-
servative welfare states show internal variation: the 
Netherlands has a mature three-pillar pension sys-
tem that dates back to the early 20th century, whereas 
Germany has begun to expand its second and third 
pillars since the turn of the 21st century. Institutional 
differences notwithstanding, policy reforms have ex-
panded the role of finance in all four cases, albeit in 
different ways. As the paper will show, the cases are 
characterized by important variations along each of 
the dimensions of pension financialization identified 
above: the scope of capital-funding, plan design, fi-
nancial management, and pension fund capitalism. 
In line with Mader et al. (2020), I carry out a con-
textualized comparison of the four patterns of pen-
sion financialization. Contextualized comparison 
moves institutional analysis beyond explanations of 
cross-national variation that centre on path depen-
dencies created by pre-existing welfare institutions. 
Rather, a contextualized approach considers how 
common pressures may set in motion different policy 
reforms in different national contexts. The approach 
revolves around the identification of institutional 
‘sticking points’ which emerge from the flexibilities 
and rigidities of the existing institutional framework 
(Thelen and Locke 1995: 342). These sticking points 
shape the salience of the policy reform to the actors 
involved and create the fault lines along which politi-
cal conflict plays out. To recast Thelen and Locke’s 
approach for present purposes: to understand which 
dimension(s) of pension financialization has (have) 
become relevant in the four cases requires identify-
ing the institutional sticking points around which poli-
cy challenges have emerged. 
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Drawing on existing case studies of pension finan-
cialization, I will show how concerns regarding the 
long-term sustainability of the pension system resulted 
in similar patterns of pension financialization in the oth-
erwise institutionally different cases of the UK and Ger-
many. In both cases, policy reforms responded to the 
perceived need to expand coverage in the second and 
third pillars of the pension system. In the Netherlands 
and Sweden, expanding coverage was not politically 
salient due to the already quasi-mandatory nature of 
workplace pensions. Instead, concerns over the costli-
ness of DB workplace pensions led to renegotiation of 
these contracts by employers and unions. In Sweden, 
such renegotiation already took place in the 1990s and 
coincided with a radical overhaul of the state pension in 
the first pillar. In the Netherlands, a continued reliance 
on DB pensions in a system with high capitalization and 
coverage throughout the financial crises of 2001 and 
2008 created large-scale underfunding of pension liabil-
ities. Here, both plan design and investment practices 
became sticking points for pension reform. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, I will 
conceptualize pension financialization, focusing on 
four dimensions that are associated with the grow-
ing role of financial markets and financial actors in 
pension provision. The second section of the paper 
applies this conceptualization of pension financial-
ization to the four cases. Here I show how the four 
dimensions identified earlier form building blocks that 
create nationally distinct patterns of pension financial-
ization. The third section of the paper contextualizes 
these findings by comparing the cases of the United 
Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. In 
the final section of the paper, I take these findings as 
a starting point to further reflect on the mechanisms 
underlying processes of pension financialization. 
What Is Pension Financialization?
While pension financialization broadly conceived 
can be defined as the growing role of financial mar-
kets and financial actors in the provision of old-age 
pensions, scholars within the field have categorized 
various empirical phenomena under this rubric. Fol-
lowing Mader et al. (2020), I propose a limited under-
standing of pension financialization by outlining four 
dimensions associated with this concept. Based on a 
review of the literature, I identify: 1) the expansion of 
capital-funding; 2) changes to pension scheme de-
sign; 3) changes to the financial management of pen-
sion plans, including the investment of assets; and 
4) the centrality of funded pension schemes in the 
(global) political economy. 
Expansion of funded pension schemes 
Pension financialization starts with the introduc-
tion of capital-funding as a method of financing. 
Capital-funding implies that pensions are to be 
(partially) financed from investment returns rather 
than current contributions or book reserves, thus 
creating a dependency on global financial mar-
kets. It is often juxtaposed with Pay-As-You-Go 
(PAYGO) financing, whereby current contributions 
pay for current benefits. Since the 1990s, capital-
funding has become an attractive policy alterna-
tive to PAYGO financing in light of growing finan-
cial pressures on public pension systems due to 
demographic ageing. As pension systems need to 
accommodate a growing group of retirees, who will 
spend more years in retirement than previous gen-
erations, the ability of the active working population 
to contribute to this system has become severely 
limited. For this reason, international organizations 
such as the World Bank, the OECD and the Euro-
pean Union produced influential policy reports that 
promoted the so-called multi-pillar pension system, 
in which retirement income is provided by a com-
bination of state (first pillar), occupational (second 
pillar) and personal (third pillar) pensions (for an 
overview, see Rodrigues et al. 2018). 
The growing importance of capital-funding within 
national pension systems has coincided with the 
expansion of private occupational and personal 
pensions (pension privatization) and a growing role 
for market-based pension providers (marketiza-
tion) (Ebbinghaus 2015). Since the 1990s, many 
states have sought to reduce pension expenditures 
by reducing citizens’ reliance on public pensions 
and instead increase the importance of private 
provisions for future retirement income. Orenstein 
(2013) shows how more than 30 countries across 
the world adopted this new policy paradigm be-
tween 1981 and 2004. Still, the expansion of capi-
tal-funding is by no means universal. Several Euro-
pean welfare states (e.g. Belgium, Austria) have so 
far maintained first pillar PAYGO pensions without 
substantially expanding the second or third pillars 
of the pension system. In a number of European 
countries, moreover, the initial introduction of fund-
ed pensions in the second pillar has been partially 
reversed, as high transition costs were exacerbated 
with mounting fiscal pressures following the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2008. This has happened, for in-
stance, in several Central and Eastern European 
countries (Naczyk and Domonkos 2016) and in 
Portugal (Rodrigues et al. 2018).1 
Since the Great Financial Crisis, the expansion 
of capital-funding through pension privatization has 
slowed. In addition to fiscal constraints, Orenstein 
(2013) argues that an ideational shift caused by 
failed reforms and growing criticism within the World 
Bank and IMF contributed to the declining appeal of 
the privatization paradigm. Since the 1990s, a grow-
ing number of countries have introduced the so-
called Notion Defined Contribution (NDC) pensions 
to improve the financial sustainability of the first pillar. 
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NDC pensions combine individual pension accounts 
with pay-as-you-go financing: citizens pay fixed con-
tributions, while retirement age and benefit levels 
are adjusted for demographic and macroeconomic 
changes. While non-funded, such pensions allow for 
flexible adjustment to changing circumstances, while 
avoiding the transition costs associated with pension 
privatization (Guardiancich et al. 2019). NDC pen-
sions therefore pose an influential policy alternative 
to capital-funding. 
Pension financialization through plan design 
Plan design shapes the extent to which investment 
returns affect pension benefits. Defined Benefit (DB) 
pension plans promise a guaranteed pension benefit 
upon retirement, for instance 70% of a beneficiary’s 
average salary. In Defined Contribution (DC) plans, 
contributions are fixed but benefits are conditional 
upon investment return. Following this logic, low in-
vestment returns directly affect retirement benefits in 
DC and indirectly in DB plans, as underfunding may 
undercut the pension promises made. Underfunding 
will therefore require higher contributions or repair 
payments from sponsors. In DC plans, investment 
risk is carried entirely by the beneficiary. The pres-
ence of institutional buffers, however, may mitigate 
participants’ financial market exposure. Such insti-
tutional buffers include, for instance, minimum in-
vestment returns and caps on investment fees for 
DC plans (Naczyk and Hassel 2019) or the pres-
ence of pension protection schemes for DB plans 
(Stewart 2007). 
DB schemes are increasingly considered less 
sustainable than DC pensions (OECD 2019a).2 De-
mographic ageing poses longevity risk, while low 
interest rates and market volatility further threaten 
DB schemes’ funding status. Additionally, DB pen-
sions are argued to be less suitable to respond 
to changing labour market conditions, such as 
increased job mobility and non-traditional work 
(ibid.). While DB schemes were widely adopted in 
the second half of the twentieth century, they have 
lost in popularity since the 1990s (OECD 2019a). 
This is not only the result of pension privatization, 
described above, but also of employers withdraw-
ing from DB workplace pensions. Employers may 
not only be motivated by cost considerations. 
Dixon and Monk (2009), for instance, argue that 
international accounting standards have incentiv-
ized employers to switch from DB to DC pensions 
to avoid being penalized by shareholders for pen-
sion liabilities on their balance sheets. Short of a 
complete transition to DC pensions, however, em-
ployers may also change the conditions of their DB 
plans, for example by introducing a contributions 
cap or removing the responsibility to make repair 
payments (Bridgen and Meyer 2009). 
Pension financialization by financial manage-
ment 
Scholars have also associated pension financial-
ization with changing practices of managing capital-
funded pension plans, including the investment of 
pension assets. This is not only the case in political 
economies that have witnessed a rise in individual 
DC pensions, but also in the case of collective DB 
pensions. Each type of plan requires a host of finan-
cial services, provided by professional groups (asset 
managers, pension lawyers, actuaries, proxy advi-
sors) that therefore stand to benefit from the world-
wide growth in pension assets. The result is a large 
network of financial intermediaries, that stand be-
tween the plan members and the financial markets 
in which their savings are invested. Such intermedia-
tion comes at a cost, as each actor within the net-
work charges fees for their services (Arjaliès et al. 
2017). Here, developments in the welfare state con-
nect to the broader process of financialization, which 
involves the growing share of profits for the financial 
sector in the economy (Krippner 2005). 
The growth of capital-funded pensions has not 
only impacted which actors are involved in pension 
management, but also the ways in which pension 
assets are invested. In particular, scholars have ob-
served a shift in pension asset allocations since the 
1980s from fixed-income assets (government or cor-
porate bonds) towards corporate shares (McCarthy et 
al. 2016), and towards alternative investments such 
as hedge funds or private equity funds in the past de-
cade (Bonizzi and Churchill 2017). This shift has not 
only been the outcome of a search for return amidst 
the high inflation environment of the 1980s or the 
booming stock markets of the 1990s, but also a func-
tion of the growing importance of financial economic 
principles in asset management practices. In particu-
lar, ideas associated with Modern Portfolio Theory 
have moved pension investors to diversify their hold-
ings across asset classes and geographic regions, 
thus growing the global pool of footloose capital. In 
this context, scholars have noted pension investors’ 
proclivity for herd behaviour - mimicking each other’s 
investment practices - which drives asset prices up 
and creates speculative bubbles (Engelen 2003). 
Pension fund capitalism 
Changes in pension investment practices have also 
had political ramifications. As global pension assets 
have grown to an unprecedented $44.1 trillion (OECD 
2019a), funded pension schemes have become influ-
ential financial actors within the political economy, a 
phenomenon also known as pension fund capitalism 
(Dixon 2008:249).3 Due to their enormous size, fund-
ed pension schemes hold large ownership stakes in 
non-financial corporations and governments across 
the globe. This ‘universal ownership’ has limited 
schemes’ ability to ‘exit’ the market by selling assets 
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in response to disappointing returns. Instead, they 
use ‘voice’ by engaging with corporations or govern-
ments to improve performance (Hawley and Williams 
2000). While some scholars welcome pension fund 
capitalism as a possible driver for a more sustainable 
financial system (Blackburn 2002; Langley 2008), 
others are sceptical of its potential. Sceptics argue, 
for instance, that pension funds are primarily driven 
by the pursuit of financial returns rather than social 
concerns (Engelen 2003); that pension funds are 
rarely in direct control of their own investments due 
to outsourcing to asset management companies and 
other financial services firms (Braun 2016); or that 
fund beneficiaries rarely have a say in how their sav-
ings are invested (McCarthy 2020). 
While pension fund capitalism is often linked to the 
declining power of organized interests such as em-
ployer groups and labour unions, its effects are not 
so clear-cut. Studies have shown how these groups 
have mobilized pension capital to serve their own 
self-interests, such as access to investment capital 
(business) or corporate control (labour) (McCarthy et 
al. 2016; Naczyk, 2016). According to Van der Zwan 
(2018), such processes of capture are indicative of a 
new financial politics of the welfare state, which does 
not revolve around distributive conflicts over benefits, 
but rather centres on solvency rules, investment poli-
cies, accounting rules and other policy measures af-
fecting the distribution of financial risk. An important 
precondition, however, is the extent to which such 
actors can exert control over the investment pro-
cess. For the United States, for instance, McCarthy 
(2017) notes that workers have limited control over 
pension investments due to the absence of employee 
representation on the boards of trustees of single-
employer pension funds. In European welfare states, 
workers are more commonly represented on pension 
fund boards (Sorsa 2016). Wiss (2015) has therefore 
argued that labour unions have a moderating impact 
on financial volatility, as their board presence results 
in more conservative investment policies. 
Patterns of Pension Financializa-
tion
The four countries represent diverse cases from 
a welfare state perspective (Seawright and Gerring 
2008).4 The United Kingdom is a liberal market econ-
omy and welfare state. Its quintessential Beveridgean 
pension system has historically provided flat-rate 
public pensions, complemented by earnings-related 
occupational schemes. Germany is a coordinated 
market economy with a conservative welfare state. Its 
pension system is historically Bismarckian: highly de-
veloped earnings-related public pensions, based on 
social insurance, with a limited role for occupational 
and personal pensions. Sweden is a coordinated 
market economy with a social-democratic welfare 
state: its two-tiered public pension system combines 
the Beveridgean flat-rate pensions with a Bismarckian 
second tier for income maintenance. The Nether-
lands, finally, is a coordinated market economy with a 
hybrid welfare state, combining elements of all three 
regime types. Its pension system is Beveridgean: it 
has a highly developed second pillar of funded oc-
cupational pensions alongside a first pillar of statutory 
PAYGO pensions. All cases except Germany have 
mature, three-pillar pension systems with long histo-
ries of capital-funding. Germany’s three-pillar system 
dates back to 2001, when the so-called Riester re-
form was passed to expand coverage of funded pen-
sion schemes in the second and third pillars. 
Source: World Bank (2020).
Figure 1.
Old-age dependency ratios in selected countries, 
1960-2018 (aged 65 and over as % aged 15-64)
All four cases are characterized by high and in-
creasing old-age dependency ratios, which challenge 
the long-term sustainability of the pension system 
(see figure 1). Nevertheless, the United Kingdom 
seems theoretically the most prone to pension fi-
nancialization, because it belongs to the regime type 
most reliant on market provision of welfare. Liberal 
market economies, such as the United Kingdom, 
are characterized by strong institutional complemen-
tarities between the welfare state and the financial 
system (Hall and Soskice 2001:18). In these coun-
tries, funded pension schemes do not only provide 
asset-based welfare, but also serve as an important 
investor base for highly developed financial markets 
(Trampusch, 2018). In the two coordinated political 
economies with mature pension systems (Sweden 
and the Netherlands), funded pensions have tra-
ditionally served as an important source of patient 
capital. Here, the state introduced legal investment 
rules to mobilize pension capital for domestic invest-
ment (Anderson 2019; McCarthy et al. 2016). The 
presence of worker presentation on pension scheme 
boards has arguably served as an institutional buffer 
against financialization in these pension systems 
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nally, the extent to which pension schemes act as 
global investors is reflected by the percentage of as-
sets invested domestically, in combination with the 
presence of legal restrictions on foreign investment. 
Where such restrictions steer pension investment 
towards domestic firms, this dimension of pension 
financialization is limited. 
The four dimensions constitute building blocks that 
together create a pattern of pension financialization. 
First, the United Kingdom has a high level of capi-
talization, yet medium coverage. This means that its 
scope of capital-funding is more limited than in the 
Netherlands or Sweden. Its combination of DC and 
DB pensions in the second pillar, combined with a 
substantial proportion of investments in fixed-income 
assets, further shape its financialization pattern. Ger-
many, secondly, is also characterized by medium 
coverage, but its capitalization rate remains low. 
While its funded workplace pensions tend to be DC, 
(ibid.). Germany presents an outlier case: with a his-
torically limited reliance on capital-funding in its pen-
sion system, it should be the least susceptible to fi-
nancialization of all four cases. 
Table 1 compares cases across the four dimen-
sions of pension financialization. The scope of cap-
ital-funding in the pension system consists of both 
its degree of capitalization and its coverage, i.e. the 
percentage of the workforce covered by funded pen-
sions. The greater the scope of capital-funding, the 
more it contributes to pension financialization. Yet, 
the scope of capital-funding should also be coupled 
with the type of plan design: the more directly finan-
cial returns shape the pension outcomes, the greater 
the plan’s contribution to pension financialization. In 
turn, financial returns are shaped by the specific al-
location of pension assets: equity and alternative 
investments create more volatility in investment 
returns than investment in fixed income assets. Fi-
Table 1.
Dimensions of pension financialization in four European welfare states (2018 or latest year available)
1: Capital-funding 2: Plan design
Coverage of funded and 
private pension plans (as % 
working age population, 15-
64 years)
Assets in fun-
ded and private 
pension plans 
as % GDP
Assets in public 
pension reserve 
funds as % 
GDP









1st 2nd 3rd 
DE - 57,0 33,8 6,9 1,0 DC (II) Y Y




SE 100,0  90,0 24,2 88,0 29,4 DC (I & II) N N




Sources: DNB Statistics (2020); OECD (2019a); OECD (2019b); Office for National Statistics (2020); Thinking Ahead Institute (2019). Funded and private pension 
schemes include private pension arrangements (funded and book reserves) and funded public arrangements. The ‘other’ category of assets includes loans, land 
and buildings, unallocated insurance contracts, hedge funds, private equity funds, structured products, other mutual funds (i.e. not invested in equities, bills and 
bonds or cash and deposits) and other investments.
3: Financial management and investment 4: Pension fund capitalism
Allocation of assets in funded and private pen-




% of assets in 






Number of top 
300 pension 
funds
Fixed Income Equities Other
DE 49,9 5,4 40,6 Y N/A N 6
NL 46,2 28,6 22,1 N 86,5 N 12
SE 16,1 13,9 5,6 N 14,4 N 7
UK 30,2 9,0 31,9 N 25,7 (2017) N 24
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the presence of investment guarantees and a rela-
tively high proportion of investments in fixed-income 
assets limit the impact of financial markets on pen-
sion outcomes. In the Netherlands, thirdly, the com-
bination of high coverage and high capitalization ar-
guably produces the largest scope of capital-funding 
of all four cases. A relatively high proportion of in-
vestments in equities and investments abroad further 
contribute to pension financialization. This is limited 
by the continued predominance of DB pension plans, 
although the case below will show that most occu-
pational plans are now DB/DC hybrids. Sweden, fi-
nally, deviates from the three other pension systems 
by having a funded component in its first pillar, along 
with funded DC pensions in the second pillar. A rela-
tively small proportion of assets is invested abroad. 
What is the explanation behind these patterns of 
variegation? Existing studies stress the importance 
of national institutional frameworks and the political 
interactions of the actors within them. To complement 
these studies, I propose a contextualized comparison 
of the four cases. Contextualized comparison is an 
analytical approach that shows how “otherwise dif-
ferent struggles in fact represent (context-specific) 
manifestations of similar strains” (Locke and Thelen 
1995: 339). It departs from traditional matched 
comparisons by taking into account starting points, 
salience and sticking points in processes of institu-
tional change. Starting points refer to the moments 
at which common pressures confront particular coun-
tries. Salience refers to the significance of the policy 
challenge to the actors involved. Both starting points 
and salience are shaped by the rigidities and flex-
ibilities embedded in the existing institutional frame-
work. Together, they inform the sticking points of a 
particular policy challenge, here defined as the sub-
stantive issues over which policy conflict takes place. 
In short, contextualized comparison seeks to explain 
“cross-national variation in conflicts centering on (dif-
ferent, nationally specific) sticking points” (Locke and 
Thelen 1995: 343). In the following section, I will use 
the three concepts of the contextualized comparison 
to offer a new interpretive lens on existing studies of 
pension financialization for each of the cases. 
Four Cases of Pension Finan-
cialization 
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has become one of the most 
studied cases of pension financialization. This is 
not coincidental: particularly in the early days of this 
scholarship, financialization was strongly associated 
with the market-based political economies of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The presence 
of highly developed pension fund capitalism seemed 
a logical outgrowth of the two countries’ large finan-
cial markets and market-oriented welfare state. The 
United Kingdom has a mature, three-pillar pension 
system, of which the second and third pillars are cap-
ital-funded. At 104,5% of GDP, capitalization of the 
pension system is high compared to other European 
political economies, especially considering relatively 
low coverage rates (OECD 2019a:211). Pension fi-
nancialization in the United Kingdom has manifested 
itself along additional dimensions, including: 1) a shift 
from occupational DB to occupational and personal 
DC pensions; 2) the marketization of pension provi-
sions; and 3) changes in funds’ asset allocations. 
The decline of DB occupational pensions in the UK 
has been well-documented. Occupational pensions 
are traditionally organized at company level. Due to 
the voluntary nature of workplace pensions, partici-
pation rates have been low compared to mandatory 
systems: they peaked at around 50% of the working 
population, before the introduction of auto-enrolment 
in 2012. The voluntary nature of the second pillar has 
also made it easier for employers to close DB pension 
schemes. Since the 2001 financial crisis, hundreds of 
DB schemes have closed and many employers have 
switched instead to DC plans (Bridgen and Meyer 
2009; Langley 2004). The Great Financial Crisis has 
reinforced the ongoing decline in DB pensions: not only 
has the number of active members in DB plans halved 
since 2010, but most remaining DB plans are now en-
tirely closed (40%) or closed to new members (43%). A 
majority of DB schemes is also underfunded (The Pen-
sions Regulator 2018). Per 2018, the percentage of the 
workforce participating in DC plans equals that of DB 
pensions (Office for National Statistics 2020). 
To explain employers’ abandonment of DB pen-
sions, scholars have pointed at increased state in-
tervention, which has affected employers’ percep-
tions of the costs associated with these plans. These 
changes were set in motion with the introduction 
of “contracting out” or opt-outs from public pension 
system to occupational or personal pensions (Mab-
bett 2012). Meant as a cost-saving measure, this 
increased the role of for-profit financial services pro-
viders. Events related to the mismanagement of pri-
vate pensions, such as the Maxwell scandal or the 
misselling of personal pension products, motivated 
the government to tighten regulations around fund-
ed pension plans again. For DB plans, these have 
included, for instance, new indexation rules (1995) 
and minimum funding requirements (1997) (Bridgen 
and Meyer 2009). In 2000, the government launched 
an alternative pension scheme, the so-called Stake-
holder Pension, a DC scheme that kept costs down 
and risks low thanks to legal limits on asset manage-
ment fees and a passive investment strategy (Mab-
bett 2012). After the 2001 financial crisis, moreover, 
the government introduced market-based valuation 
of DB liabilities and increased premiums for the Pen-
sion Protection Fund (Wiss 2019). 
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Poor financial performance and persistent under-
funding of DB pension plans created institutional 
sticking points for increased regulation. Langley 
(2006) has described, for instance, how UK pension 
investors first began to replace fixed-income assets 
with corporate stocks in the high-inflation economic 
context of the 1960s and 1970s. Such asset allo-
cations proved highly lucrative amidst the booming 
stock markets of the 1980s and 1990s, with employ-
ers granting themselves premium holidays thanks 
to high investment returns. Wiss (2019:506) notes, 
however, that UK pension funds were more exposed 
to corporate equities than other European pension 
funds (71% of total assets) prior to the 2001 financial 
crisis. This made them particularly vulnerable to the 
stock market crash. Since the Great Financial Crisis 
of 2007-2008, UK pension funds have reduced their 
investment in corporate equities and shifted their al-
locations to alternative asset classes (Bonizzi and 
Churchill 2017). 
The policy response to the Great Financial Crisis, 
however, has not been a reversal of pension finan-
cialization. Instead, the state has sought to broaden 
coverage of capital-funded occupational plans by 
making participation mandatory. Since 2012, auto-
enrolment in occupational plans is in place, whereby 
employers can opt between a pension provider of 
their own choice or directing employees towards the 
state-run default provider, the National Employee 
Savings Trust (NEST) (Mabbett 2012). According to 
the Office of National Statistics (2020), three-quarters 
of the workforce is now covered by an occupational 
pension plan, the highest level since the introduction 
of auto-enrolment. That state intervention has driven 
pension financialization since the turn of the century 
is therefore the paradoxical outcome of particular pol-
icy challenges stemming from employer voluntarism 
and financial mismanagement (Berry 2016). 
Germany
The German conservative welfare state is often 
considered the very opposite of the liberal welfare 
states of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The quintessential social insurance system, Germany 
has been represented as a case of “belated multipil-
larization” and a “least likely case of pension finan-
cialization” (Wiss 2019:512) due to the comparatively 
limited scope of capital-funding within the pension 
system. The German first pillar consists of a means-
tested statutory pension, which has been in place 
since 1889. The German second pillar consists of five 
different occupational pension vehicles, all of them 
voluntary. Among these are superannuation funds 
(Pensionskassen), offering DC-type pensions, and 
corporate book reserves (Direktzusage). The latter 
have been complimentary to Germany’s bank-based 
financial system, providing patient capital to firms and 
sheltering them from market finance (Carstensen and 
Röper 2019). Due to its long existence and relative 
generosity, the statutory pension has crowded out 
second and third pillar provisions, which became an 
important sticking point for pension reform. In 2015, 
the statutory pension constituted 74% of the income 
for German pensioners, while the old-age depen-
dency ratio was above the EU average (European 
Commission 2018). Still, capitalization rates for the 
German pension system remain among the lowest in 
Europe: 6,9% in 2017 (OECD 2019a: 211). 
From the late 1980s onwards, German policy-
makers questioned the long-term sustainability of the 
pension system, due to its strong reliance on the first 
pillar in the face of a rapidly ageing population. Since 
the 1990s, therefore, several reforms have been 
enacted to facilitate a move away from the PAYGO 
first pillar and towards capital-funded occupational 
and personal pensions. The most notable of these, 
the 2001 Riester reforms, were to compensate for 
statutory pension cutbacks by subsidizing capital-
funded occupational and personal pension plans, 
predominantly DC (Ebbinghaus 2019; Wiss 2019). 
Carstensen and Röper (2019) place the Riester re-
form in the context of a broader process of financial 
liberalization in Germany: to those in favor of moving 
towards a more market-based financial system, cap-
ital-funded pensions were a highly salient policy is-
sue. Capital-funding would not only foster the growth 
of German financial markets, but also encourage 
pension privatization. 
The ongoing incentivization of capital-funded pen-
sions in Germany has meant the entrance of new 
players into the pension system. Banks and invest-
ment companies began to compete with for-profit in-
surance companies in marketizing new pension prod-
ucts, with Deutsche Bank proposing Anglo-American 
pension funds as early as in 1995 (Carstensen and 
Röper 2019). Six years later, American-style Pen-
sionsfonds were introduced as part of the broader 
Riester reform. These new pension vehicles man-
age collective, occupational pension plans for certain 
sectors, such as the metalworking industry (Metallr-
ente) and the chemical industry (Chemie), under bi-
partite governance by employers and trade unions. 
Contrary to the Pensionskassen, the Pensionsfonds 
have complete freedom to invest (Pensionskassen 
face restrictions on certain asset classes). In practice, 
however, the Pensionsfonds predominantly invest in 
fixed-term assets and guarantee the nominal value of 
contributions. For this reason, Wiss (2019:512) has 
called these pension plans “DC-light.” 
Since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the fi-
nancialization process within the German pension 
system has continued through 1) a further expan-
sion of capital-funded pensions; 2) a reduction in 
the legally required investment guarantees (down 
from 3.25% in 2007 to 0.9% in 2017) and 3) the 
2017 introduction of collectively bargained, auto-
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enrolment DC plans without investment guaran-
tees (Wiss 2019). These changes have further 
increased a financial risk shift from state and em-
ployers to wage-earners. According to Wiss (ibid: 
512), this has resulted in “UK-style semi-obligatory 
financialization of the ‘everyday life’ of employees.” 
As of 2015, 70% of the working age population was 
covered by a voluntary pension contract (OECD 
2019a:207). While the capitalization of the German 
pension system remains low, it shares important 
commonalities with the United Kingdom: a largely 
voluntarist second pillar and concomitant low cov-
erage rates became sticking points for pension re-
form. The state responded to these sustainability 
challenges by introducing tax-subsidized savings 
vehicles and auto-enrolment. Even though Ger-
many remains a laggard, pension financialization 
has taken on a liberal appearance, with individu-
als’ pension savings providing the foundations for a 
state-driven expansion of financial markets. 
The Netherlands
The Netherlands has a mature, three-pillar pen-
sion system, of which the first two pillars (the statu-
tory pension and the occupational pension) contrib-
ute most to citizens’ retirement income. The statutory 
pension, introduced in 1956, is financed on a PAYGO 
basis from social insurance contributions and gen-
eral taxation. The occupational pensions, the old-
est of which date back to the late 19th century, are 
capital-funded. Almost every Dutch employee (96% 
of the workforce) participates in an occupational pen-
sion plan due to the (quasi)mandatory nature of the 
second pillar. Occupational pension plans are pre-
dominantly DB, although the number of DC plans has 
been on the rise since the turn of the century. They 
are almost exclusively managed by pension funds, 
organized by company and by industry (Anderson 
2011). The combination of a longstanding tradition of 
capital-funding, high participation rates and compar-
atively generous occupational pensions has resulted 
in a highly capitalized pension system, whose ratio of 
pension assets to GDP is among the highest in the 
world at 173,3% (OECD 2019a:211). 
Its history of capital-funding notwithstanding, the 
Dutch pension system has long been sheltered from 
financial market turbulence. Two factors have con-
tributed to the historical stability of the system. First 
is the specific nature of most occupational pensions 
as collectively organized, DB plans. This means that 
any investment losses incurred can be absorbed by 
the collectivity, rather than being carried by the in-
dividual plan member. The DB promise, moreover, 
binds the sponsoring employer to compensate for 
such losses in cases of underfunding, either by pay-
ing higher contributions or by making repair pay-
ments (Anderson 2011). A second contributing factor 
has been the investment practices of Dutch pension 
funds, which were dominated by fixed-income invest-
ments for most of the twentieth century. When Dutch 
pension funds made the switch to so-called real as-
sets, predominantly corporate equities, they ben-
efited from fortuitous stock market conditions in the 
1980s and 1990s (McCarthy et al. 2016). This means 
that, on the aggregate, financial performance of the 
system has been fairly robust. 
As in the United Kingdom, however, changing as-
set allocations have made Dutch pension funds quite 
vulnerable to stock market downturns. The financial 
crises of 2001 and 2008 have resulted in deteriorat-
ing investment returns, which in turn have translated 
into declining funding levels for pension funds. This 
development has coincided with a broader risk shift 
from the employer to the employee. After reaping the 
fruits of the stock market boom of the 1990s in the 
shape of premium holidays and repayments, em-
ployers have withdrawn from the DB pension prom-
ise by capping contribution rates and rejecting repair 
payments. This applies to the nominal pension as well 
as to indexation, which was made conditional upon 
investment performance in 2001. Since the Great 
Financial Crisis, situations of underfunding resulted 
in a reduction of pension entitlements for millions of 
active and retired members. These crisis measures 
have been extended through the 2010 Pension Ac-
cord, the outcome of tripartite negotiations between 
the state, employers and unions. Consequently, 
Dutch occupational pensions are now DB/DC hybrids 
(Van der Zwan 2018; Wiss 2019). 
Unlike the United Kingdom or Germany, Dutch 
employers and labor unions have been actively in-
volved in the policy processes leading to pension fi-
nancialization. As Anderson (2019) has pointed out, 
financialization does not always imply the crowd-
ing out of labour market actors, such as organized 
employers and unions, by financial actors. In the 
Dutch pension system, as in Sweden and Denmark, 
collectivism has characterized the historical trajec-
tory to financialization. In the Netherlands, unions 
and organized employers not only negotiate oc-
cupational pension plans, but also jointly manage 
pension fund boards and deliberate on pension 
policy within corporatist fora like the Socio-Eco-
nomic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER). 
However, even though the involvement of unions in 
pension governance is said to lead to less financial 
risk-taking (Wiss 2015), this does not seem to be 
the case for Dutch pension funds: their exposure 
to equity markets and markets for alternative in-
vestments continues to be relatively higher (OECD 
2019a). Possible explanations include unions’ 
agreement with riskier investment practices to sus-
tain higher pension benefits (McCarthy et al. 2016) 
or the outsourcing of asset management activities 
to Anglo-American, for-profit financial firms (Enge-
len, Konings, and Fernandez 2008). 
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With high capitalization, the presence of large and 
powerful pension funds and the ongoing dissolution 
of DB pension promises, the Netherlands stands out 
from the other three cases. First, the quasi-mandatory 
nature of the Dutch second pillar has resulted in very 
high participation rates, which means that the state 
has not needed to intervene with public savings op-
tions such as NEST in the UK or the Riester pen-
sions in Germany. Second, the Netherlands has seen 
continued involvement of labor unions in pension 
management. This is important in two ways. First, 
employers have been unable to completely abandon 
DB pension schemes. Instead, the renegotiation of 
DB pension contracts has become a sticking point 
for pension reform. Second, the type of self-man-
agement that is expected of workers with individual 
DC pensions is absent in the Netherlands. Instead, 
Dutch workers have very little control over how their 
pension savings are invested, an issue that has in-
creasingly become politically salient. Even though the 
investment practices of Dutch pension funds are very 
similar to those in the United Kingdom, Dutch citizens 
experience pension financialization very differently. 
Sweden
The Swedish three-pillar pension system differs 
substantially from the Dutch system, particularly in 
the first pillar. In 2019, capital-funded pension sav-
ings were 88% of GDP. Swedish public pension pro-
visions consist of a NDC pension (Inkomstpension) 
in the first tier, a mandatory individual DC pension 
(Premiepension) in the second tier and a supple-
mentary guarantee pension for low-income earners. 
Contributions for the Inkomstpension and the Pre-
miepension are 16% and 2,5% of wages, respec-
tively. While the premium pension universalizes the 
scope of capital-funding in the Swedish pension 
system, its importance is restricted by a relatively 
low contribution rate. In contrast to the other cases, 
Sweden also has several very large pension reserve 
funds (AP1 through AP4 and AP6). Assets in these 
reserve funds equal an additional 29,4% of GDP 
(OECD 2019a: 211). The reserve funds face invest-
ment restrictions: AP1 through 4 have legal limits 
on investment in particular asset classes, while AP6 
invests entirely in private equity. 
Most Swedish workers (90%) participate in 
quasi-mandatory occupational pension schemes. 
Contrary to the Netherlands, most Swedish occu-
pational pensions are DC schemes, yet collectively 
managed by employers and unions (Lindquist and 
Wadensjö 2011). Compared to the Netherlands, the 
starting point for the renegotiation of occupational 
pension contracts was much earlier: already in 1996 
employer group SAF and union LO agreed to switch 
from a DB to a DC pension plan for the private sec-
tor, with the white-collar ITP fund following suit in 
2017 (Anderson 2019). Under the new scheme, 
members can make their own investment choices, 
although restrictions exist on how much risk they 
can take. Employers and unions are highly involved 
in financial management: they jointly own the clear-
ing houses for the SAF-LO and ITP schemes, which 
allows them to screen financial services providers 
and keep the fee structures low (ibid.). In this re-
spect, the Swedish second pillar differs substantially 
from the United Kingdom and Germany. 
While the Swedish pension system has a capi-
talization rate that is well below those of the United 
Kingdom or the Netherlands, it is still considered 
highly financialized because of the universalism of 
the premium pension (Belfrage 2008, 2017). The 
premium pension scheme is self-directed: individual 
participants must decide themselves how contribu-
tions are invested and they may choose from around 
800 mutual funds. For those participants who wish 
to refrain from active investment, the state offers the 
option of a default fund (AP7). Even more so than the 
NEST pensions in the UK, the Swedish premium pen-
sions were intended to “cultivate the skills and ethos 
of asset-based welfare” (Belfrage 2017:15–16). The 
Swedish reform therefore resembles the introduc-
tion of NEST in the UK and the Riester pensions in 
Germany, in the sense that it aims to make pension 
savers into investor-subjects. Still, almost half of the 
premium pension savers opt for the default fund. In 
efforts to reduce the number of mutual funds in the 
marketplace, the state has tightened regulatory stan-
dards. As of 2019, 553 mutual funds were still active 
(OECD 2019a:35). 
The Swedish first pillar is unique among European 
welfare states, reflecting the institutional legacies of 
the previous pension system. Until the late 1990s, 
the pension system consisted of a statutory basic 
pension (Folkspensionen, which provided a univer-
sal flat-rate benefit) and a supplemental DB scheme 
(Allmänna Tjänstepensionen, ATP). The ATP scheme 
was managed by tripartite funds (Allmänna Pen-
sionsfonderna, AP), which served an important role 
in the Swedish export-led growth model. Financed 
by employer contributions, the AP funds purchased 
government and corporate bonds, thereby provid-
ing cheap capital to the public and private sectors of 
the economy. Investment in shares was prohibited 
and employers could re-borrow up to 50% of their 
pension contributions. The result was an important 
complementarity between the welfare state and the 
industrial economy: while the pension contributions 
kept wages low and inflation in check, the availability 
of cheap capital helped Swedish firms maintain inter-
national competitiveness (Belfrage 2008). 
The dissolution of the ATP system has also meant 
the end of the centrality of pension capital within the 
Swedish export-led growth model. As in the United 
Kingdom, however, the pension system was not im-
mune to financial liberalization (Belfrage 2017). The 
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subsequent integration into global financial markets 
has not only affected the AP funds, which continue 
to exist as public sector buffer funds, but also Swed-
ish citizens. Average investment returns on premium 
pension savings have suffered in the wake of the 
Great Financial Crisis, although the impact has been 
limited to the small portion of contributions flowing 
into the premium pension system (Sundén 2009). 
Discussion and conclusion 
In the preceding sections, I have conceptual-
ized pension financialization in a limiting manner 
by identifying four dimensions associated with the 
growing role of financial markets and actors in pen-
sion provision. Pension financialization is first and 
foremost seen as the growing reliance on capital-
funded pensions within pension systems. A large 
scope of capital-funding is present in both the lib-
eral and the two coordinated market economies 
with mature, three-pillar pension systems (United 
Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands). Germany 
remains a laggard in terms of both the size and 
coverage of its funded pension system. Pension fi-
nancialization, however, also proceeds along other 
dimensions. In the UK, Sweden and Germany, DC 
pensions have begun to replace DB schemes with-
in the second pillar. Sweden’s state pension is also 
based on a (N)DC funding logic in two of its three 
tiers. Average asset allocations reveal a more un-
even picture, with equity investments having more 
importance in the Netherlands and alternative in-
vestments in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Funded pension schemes have established them-
selves as large, global investors most strongly in 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
The contextualized comparison of the four cases 
has revealed that these patterns of financialization 
have evolved out of particular sticking points, created 
by institutional legacies within the pension system. 
In the UK, retrenchment of the state pension and 
employers’ abandonment of occupational DB plans 
have been major driving forces towards individual DC 
schemes. In 2012, the state intervened by creating a 
public alternative in the form of the NEST auto-en-
rolment scheme. In Germany, voluntarism has also 
complicated the state´s efforts to grow coverage of 
occupational pensions. Tax subsidies and other in-
centives have so far proven insufficient to tackle the 
substantial sustainability challenges confronting the 
German pension system, with its strong reliance on 
the statutory pension and one of the highest (pro-
jected) old-age dependency ratios in Europe. Since 
2017, the German state has followed the UK exam-
ple by introducing auto-enrolment in its second pillar. 
In both countries, the issue of coverage has therefore 
been an important institutional sticking point around 
which pension financialization has proceeded.
In some respects, the Swedish case looks simi-
lar to the UK and, to a lesser extent, to Germany. 
In Sweden, as in the UK, the state has also driven 
financialization by introducing a new DC pension, al-
beit in the first rather than the second pillar. Yet, the 
Swedish premium pension also differs in important 
respects from the auto-enrolment plans in the UK 
and Germany. Rather than an occupational pension, 
it is a public savings plan that serves as a second 
tier on top of the NDC pension. Rather than provid-
ing a private alternative to the public pension, its goal 
is to increase replacement rates in the first pillar. Its 
relatively low contribution rate (2,5%) is indicative 
of the schemes’ supplementary role within the over-
all pension system. Thanks to its universalism, the 
Swedish premium pension has become exemplary 
for pension financialization. Like the UK’s NEST, it 
has been argued to represent a public policy inter-
vention to create a mass investment culture, bestow-
ing personal responsibility for financial planning and 
literacy upon individual citizens (i.e. Belfrage 2008; 
Berry 2016). The need for behavioral nudges (auto-
enrolment, investment defaults) in both cases also 
show the limitations of these policy interventions. 
At the same time, Sweden continues to have a 
substantial second pillar of occupational pensions, 
similar to the Netherlands. In both countries, quasi-
mandatory participation has resulted in high cover-
age rates, which have considerably expanded the 
scope of capital-funding within these systems. Qua-
si-mandatory participation has also limited possibili-
ties for employers to exit the second pillar. This has 
meant that pressures to reduce the reliance on DB 
pensions had to be renegotiated with labor unions. 
While undergoing a similar process, Sweden and 
the Netherlands have had different starting points. 
In Sweden, discussions over DB in the second pillar 
led to reform in the 1990s, with unions and employ-
ers maintaining responsibility over financial manage-
ment – including limited risk-taking in investment 
decisions. In the Netherlands, a continued reliance 
on DB pensions coincided with a change in portfolio 
allocations towards riskier asset classes. The finan-
cial crises of 2001 and 2008 caused widespread un-
derfunding of DB plans. Since then, social partners 
and the state have entered a long reform process to 
renegotiate occupational pension contracts. They re-
cently agreed on the implementation of a collective 
defined contribution scheme by 2025. 
In their review of existing literature, Mader et 
al. (2020) have called for a conceptualization of fi-
nancialization that is mechanistic in addition to be-
ing limiting and contextualized. The contextualized 
comparison in this paper provides a starting point 
to consider the underlying mechanisms of pension 
financialization in the four cases. In the two volunta-
rist systems, the institutional legacy of low coverage 
created institutional sticking points for the need to re-
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lieve fiscal pressures on the first pillar by expanding 
occupational and personal pensions. In the absence 
of mandatory participation, the state interventions 
were needed to boost individual pension savings. In 
the two mandatory systems, the combination of high 
coverage and the prevalence of DB pensions created 
different institutional sticking points. Here, renegotia-
tion of DB contracts became a salient political issue 
in the second pillar, although the timing differs for 
both countries. These mechanisms are of course not 
exhaustive. Further research needs to shed light on 
whether similar mechanisms apply in other countries 
as well, including in welfare states where policy ef-
forts to expand financialized pensions have failed. 
Pension financialization has important repercus-
sions for the security and adequacy of old-age pen-
sions. When pensions are capital-funded, poor in-
vestment results will translate into lower pensions, 
although to what extent depends on the nature of 
the pension contract and institutional context. The 
combination of stock market volatility and low inter-
est rates since the Great Financial Crisis has threat-
ened both the benefit levels of DC pensions and the 
funding status of DB pensions plans. The impact on 
the legitimacy of funded pension systems may be 
profound. The higher education strikes in the United 
Kingdom in 2019 or the historically low public confi-
dence in the Dutch pension system show the conten-
tious nature of pension financialization, even in coun-
tries with long histories of capital-funded pensions. 
Where this is the case, pension financialization may 
have the paradoxical effect of increasing the burden 
on the state, whether in the shape of regulation or in 
demands for better public pensions.
Notes
[1] Notable cases of privatization reversals outside Europe 
include Argentina and Chile (Orenstein 2013).
[2] It should be noted that some influential voices have ar-
gued that neither DB nor DC schemes are inherently un-
sustainable. Barr and Diamond (2009) argue, for instance, 
that pension sustainability depends on the successful 
adjustment of the particular parameters of each scheme 
within the specific context of a national pension system.
[3] Dixon (2008:249) defines pension fund capitalism as “a 
capitalism in which pension funds, financial institutions 
in their own right, will increasingly become the source of 
corporate engagement and the providers of social wel-
fare and public infrastructure in the twenty-first century”.
[4] Here, I draw on two theories. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism identifies three 
types of welfare states: the liberal welfare state of the 
Anglo-American political economies, the conservative 
welfare state of the continental political economies and 
the social-democratic welfare states of Northern Eu-
rope. Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001) 
distinguishes Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) from 
Coordinated Markets Economies (CMEs). While the 
VoC approach relates to production regimes rather than 
welfare regimes, its category of Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) overlaps with the conservative and 
social-democratic welfare states from Esping-Anders-
en’s typology.
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